Grades: A (90-100), B (80-89), C (70-79), D (60-69), F (0-59). Critical exposures cap the grade regardless of numeric score.
| Section | Score | Grade | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| Config Posture | B | 82/100 points | |
| Deployment Verification | A | 7/7 applicable checks passed | |
| Detection Coverage | A | 20/20 scenarios detected | |
| MCP Protection | C | 10 servers scored, 0 client parse errors |
| Scenario | Category | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| AWS access key in URL path | DLP Exfiltration | DETECTED | dlp |
| Base64-encoded GitHub token | DLP Exfiltration | DETECTED | dlp |
| Hex-encoded Slack token | DLP Exfiltration | DETECTED | dlp |
| Anthropic API key in text body | DLP Exfiltration | DETECTED | 1 matches |
| OpenAI API key in URL | DLP Exfiltration | DETECTED | dlp |
| Private key (WIF format) in URL | DLP Exfiltration | DETECTED | dlp |
| Classic instruction override | Prompt Injection | DETECTED | Prompt Injection |
| Leetspeak evasion | Prompt Injection | DETECTED | Prompt Injection |
| Base64-wrapped injection | Prompt Injection | DETECTED | Encoded Payload |
| Credential solicitation | Prompt Injection | DETECTED | Credential Solicitation |
| Memory persistence directive | Prompt Injection | DETECTED | Memory Persistence Directive |
| Role override (DAN jailbreak) | Prompt Injection | DETECTED | Jailbreak Attempt, jailbreak_attempt, Role Override |
| IMPORTANT tag in description | Tool Poisoning | DETECTED | 1 matches |
| Exfiltration in schema default | Tool Poisoning | DETECTED | 1 matches |
| Cross-tool manipulation | Tool Poisoning | DETECTED | 1 matches |
| Vendor extension with instructions | Tool Poisoning | DETECTED | 1 matches |
| URL-encoded secret in path | URL Evasion | DETECTED | dlp |
| CRLF injection in URL | URL Evasion | DETECTED | crlf_injection |
| Overlong URL | URL Evasion | DETECTED | length |
| Path traversal | URL Evasion | DETECTED | path_traversal |
| Server Name | Client | Transport | Protection | Risk | Command |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| dev-db-tools | claude-code | stdio | UNPROTECTED | high | npx |
| local-filesystem | cursor | stdio | UNPROTECTED | high | npx |
| staging-deploy | vscode | stdio | UNPROTECTED | medium | node |
| internal-docs | claude-code | stdio | PIPELOCK | low | pipelock |
| prod-api | claude-code | stdio | PIPELOCK | low | pipelock |
| slack-notifications | claude-code | stdio | PIPELOCK | low | pipelock |
| github-copilot-tools | cursor | stdio | PIPELOCK | low | pipelock |
| jira-integration | cursor | stdio | PIPELOCK | low | pipelock |
| aws-bedrock | vscode | stdio | PIPELOCK | low | pipelock |
| datadog-monitoring | vscode | stdio | PIPELOCK | low | pipelock |
| Severity | Category | Source | Title / Detail | Remediation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | mcp_protection | discover |
MCP server "dev-db-tools" (claude-code) is unprotected
|
Wrap this MCP server with pipelock: `pipelock mcp proxy --config pipelock.yaml -- <original-command>`. High-risk servers with database or shell access should be prioritized. |
| HIGH | mcp_protection | discover |
MCP server "local-filesystem" (cursor) is unprotected
|
Wrap this MCP server with pipelock: `pipelock mcp proxy --config pipelock.yaml -- <original-command>`. High-risk servers with database or shell access should be prioritized. |
| MEDIUM | Adaptive Enforcement | audit_score |
Adaptive enforcement not enabled; anomalous agent behavior will not trigger automatic escalation
|
Enable adaptive enforcement with `adaptive_enforcement: {enabled: true}`. |
| MEDIUM | Kill Switch | audit_score |
Kill switch has only 1 source configured; recommend API listener and SIGUSR1 for defense-in-depth
|
Configure kill switch with multiple sources (config, API, sentinel file). |
| MEDIUM | MCP Tool Policy | audit_score |
Tool policy missing patterns for persistence tools (write_file, create_directory) and network tools (curl, wget)
|
Add tool policy rules to restrict dangerous tool calls. See docs/configuration.md. |
| MEDIUM | mcp_protection | discover |
MCP server "staging-deploy" (vscode) is unprotected
|
Wrap this MCP server with pipelock: `pipelock mcp proxy --config pipelock.yaml -- <original-command>`. |
| INFO | Enforcement | audit_score |
Using balanced mode; strict mode provides maximum protection for high-security environments
|
Switch to strict mode with `mode: strict` for maximum protection. |
| INFO | Tool Chain Detection | audit_score |
Only 1 tool chain rule; consider adding chains for read-then-delete and search-then-exfiltrate patterns
|
Enable chain detection with `tool_chain_detection: {enabled: true}`. |
pipelock assess verify <run-dir> --agent <agent-name>