<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>AI Agent Security Blog: Research, CVE Analysis, Runtime Defense on PipeLab</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/</link><description>Recent content in AI Agent Security Blog: Research, CVE Analysis, Runtime Defense on PipeLab</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Sat, 13 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://pipelab.org/blog/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Pipelock v2.6: Inspection Moves to the Operation Boundary</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/pipelock-v260-release/</link><pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/pipelock-v260-release/</guid><description>Pipelock v2.6 decides egress by operation, not just by host: allow or deny individual API and GraphQL operations, catch prompt injection hidden in files, bridge hook-based agent events into the scanner pipeline, and harden MCP against the attack chains the NSA guidance calls out.</description></item><item><title>What Stateless MCP Means for Agent Runtime Security</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/what-stateless-mcp-means-for-agent-runtime-security/</link><pubDate>Sat, 23 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/what-stateless-mcp-means-for-agent-runtime-security/</guid><description>MCP 2026-07-28 deletes the session. Here&amp;rsquo;s what that changes at the runtime layer, and why outside-the-agent mediation matters more under stateless.</description></item><item><title>What the NSA's MCP security guidance says, and what an agent firewall does</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/nsa-mcp-security-guidance/</link><pubDate>Fri, 22 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/nsa-mcp-security-guidance/</guid><description>The NSA&amp;rsquo;s May 2026 MCP guidance names filtering outgoing proxies, DLP, sandboxing, message integrity, output filtering, and local MCP scans. Here is where an agent firewall fits.</description></item><item><title>Pipelock v2.5.0: Portable Audit Evidence and Host Containment</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/pipelock-v250-release/</link><pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/pipelock-v250-release/</guid><description>Pipelock v2.5.0 adds Audit Packet verifiers, host containment lifecycle commands, strict federation, MCP integrity manifests, and broader IDE coverage.</description></item><item><title>Per-Pod NetworkPolicy in Practice: Migrating Five Agents in a Day</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/per-pod-networkpolicy-five-agents-field-report/</link><pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/per-pod-networkpolicy-five-agents-field-report/</guid><description>A field report on moving five Kubernetes-deployed AI agents from in-pod sidecars to companion-pod separation. The non-glamorous lessons that burned cycles.</description></item><item><title>Mediator Receipts: The Question to Ask About Agent Attestation</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/independent-attestation-mediator-receipts/</link><pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/independent-attestation-mediator-receipts/</guid><description>Signed receipts from your AI agent are real. Who held the pen is what decides whether they&amp;rsquo;re evidence or self-report.</description></item><item><title>Three Things "Set HTTPS_PROXY" Cannot Stop</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/three-things-https-proxy-cannot-stop/</link><pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/three-things-https-proxy-cannot-stop/</guid><description>Setting HTTPS_PROXY is policy. Three bypass shapes the kernel doesn&amp;rsquo;t agree with: env-cleared subprocesses, non-HTTP transports, and NO_PROXY domains.</description></item><item><title>Capture and Replay: Testing Security Policy Without Production Risk</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/capture-replay-policy-shadow-deploy/</link><pubDate>Tue, 12 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/capture-replay-policy-shadow-deploy/</guid><description>Changing a live security policy breaks workflows somewhere. Record real verdicts, replay against the candidate config, see the diff before you ship.</description></item><item><title>Pipelock Agent Egress Control: the missing CI primitive for AI agents</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/agent-egress-control-launch/</link><pubDate>Sun, 10 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/agent-egress-control-launch/</guid><description>Pipelock Agent Egress Control is a GitHub Action that runs an agent script through Pipelock with kernel-enforced network containment and produces a signed Audit Packet a third party can verify.</description></item><item><title>Wedge Detection: Knowing Your Security Proxy Still Works</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/wedge-detection-security-proxy/</link><pubDate>Sun, 10 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/wedge-detection-security-proxy/</guid><description>A liveness probe that returns 200 doesn&amp;rsquo;t prove the request pipeline is making progress. Monitoring can stay green while enforcement stalls. Here&amp;rsquo;s how to detect that.</description></item><item><title>Block-Reason Headers: Make Your Security Proxy Tell You Why</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/block-reason-headers-agent-debugging/</link><pubDate>Sat, 09 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/block-reason-headers-agent-debugging/</guid><description>A 403 from a security proxy with no reason is a black hole for the agent. The X-Pipelock-Block-Reason header gives the agent a structured signal it can route around.</description></item><item><title>What Pipelock Inspects, And What Tool Policy Inspects Instead</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/pipelock-inspection-layers/</link><pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/pipelock-inspection-layers/</guid><description>Pipelock scans wire bytes. Opaque media bytes pass through that layer untouched and get caught at a different layer: tool policy URL rules and tool-chain detection.</description></item><item><title>subPath ConfigMap Mounts Don't Hot-Reload: Silent Drift in Kubernetes</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/subpath-configmap-no-hot-reload/</link><pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/subpath-configmap-no-hot-reload/</guid><description>Mount a ConfigMap with subPath and kubelet stops propagating updates. Your service&amp;rsquo;s hot-reload watches a frozen file. Documented behavior, easy to miss, real impact.</description></item><item><title>Webhook vs Egress: Two Architectures for AI Agent Security</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/webhook-vs-egress-ai-agent-security/</link><pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/webhook-vs-egress-ai-agent-security/</guid><description>Webhook-based controls work when the platform cooperates. Network-egress firewalls work at the traffic boundary. Here is where each fits.</description></item><item><title>The Three-UID Containment Pattern for AI Agents on Linux</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/three-uid-agent-containment-linux/</link><pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/three-uid-agent-containment-linux/</guid><description>A working agent containment story on Linux needs three UIDs, not two. The proxy UID has internet by design, so the agent UID has to be a third identity.</description></item><item><title>Politeness vs Enforcement: Why "Set HTTPS_PROXY" Isn't a Security Control</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/politeness-vs-enforcement-https-proxy/</link><pubDate>Tue, 05 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/politeness-vs-enforcement-https-proxy/</guid><description>HTTPS_PROXY env vars and tool deny-lists are policy, not enforcement. Here&amp;rsquo;s the line between them and what crossing it actually takes.</description></item><item><title>Pipelock v2.4.0: Learn-and-Lock Contracts for Agent Traffic</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/pipelock-v240-release/</link><pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/pipelock-v240-release/</guid><description>Pipelock v2.4.0 adds observed-traffic contracts, shadow replay, block reason headers, inbound envelope verification, and Gemini redaction.</description></item><item><title>Pipelock v2.3.0: Class-Preserving Redaction and Generic SSE Streaming</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/pipelock-v230-release/</link><pubDate>Fri, 24 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/pipelock-v230-release/</guid><description>Pipelock v2.3.0 adds class-preserving request redaction and generic SSE streaming response scanning, plus a release-blocker pass and a tech-debt sprint.</description></item><item><title>Pipelock v2.2.0: Companion Proxies, Session Recovery, and Signed Mediation</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/pipelock-v220-release/</link><pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/pipelock-v220-release/</guid><description>Pipelock v2.2.0 adds Kubernetes companion-proxy generation, session recovery controls, posture verification, signed mediation, and strict YAML parsing.</description></item><item><title>What CSA, SANS, and OWASP Just Told Every CISO About Runtime Agent Security</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/mythos-ready-in-20-minutes/</link><pubDate>Mon, 13 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/mythos-ready-in-20-minutes/</guid><description>A joint briefing from CSA, SANS, and OWASP lays out 11 priority actions for the post-Mythos threat environment. Four of them describe runtime agent controls in detail but name zero tools. Here is what they are asking for.</description></item><item><title>Why AI Guardrails Aren't Enough for Agent Security</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/why-ai-guardrails-arent-enough/</link><pubDate>Sun, 12 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/why-ai-guardrails-arent-enough/</guid><description>AI guardrails classify prompts and completions at the model layer. They miss everything that happens in HTTP, MCP, and tool responses. Here&amp;rsquo;s what else you need.</description></item><item><title>The AI Agent Security Acquisition Wave: What It Means for Buyers</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/ai-agent-security-acquisition-wave-2026/</link><pubDate>Sun, 12 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/ai-agent-security-acquisition-wave-2026/</guid><description>Six AI agent security deals announced in recent months (five closed, one pending). What the consolidation means for buyers, and why permissive licensing still matters.</description></item><item><title>Best AI Agent Security Tools 2026: 24 Options by Boundary</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/best-ai-agent-security-tools-2026/</link><pubDate>Sun, 12 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/best-ai-agent-security-tools-2026/</guid><description>25 AI agent security options mapped to the six boundaries: model gateway, MCP gateway, identity, platform governance, runtime containment, and network egress.</description></item><item><title>Why Domain Allowlists Aren't Enough for AI Agent Security</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/why-domain-allowlists-arent-enough/</link><pubDate>Sun, 12 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/why-domain-allowlists-arent-enough/</guid><description>Domain allowlisting is a necessary first layer for agent egress control. It is not sufficient on its own. Here&amp;rsquo;s what gets through, with receipts.</description></item><item><title>MCP Scanner Comparison: Cisco vs Snyk vs Pipelock</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/mcp-scanner-comparison-2026/</link><pubDate>Sun, 12 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/mcp-scanner-comparison-2026/</guid><description>Three MCP security tools compared: Cisco mcp-scanner, Snyk agent-scan (formerly Invariant), and Pipelock. What each catches and where they differ.</description></item><item><title>The State of MCP Security 2026: Incidents, Attack Patterns, and Defense Coverage</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/state-of-mcp-security-2026/</link><pubDate>Sun, 12 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/state-of-mcp-security-2026/</guid><description>A data-backed look at MCP security in 2026: public incidents, disclosed CVEs, OWASP MCP Top 10 mapping, and control coverage across scanners, gateways, and runtime inspection.</description></item><item><title>Claude Mythos Can Find Zero-Days. What Happens When Your Coding Agent Can Too?</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/claude-mythos-agent-security/</link><pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/claude-mythos-agent-security/</guid><description>Anthropic&amp;rsquo;s Mythos model finds zero-day vulnerabilities autonomously. That same capability, running inside a coding agent with your credentials, is a different kind of threat.</description></item><item><title>I published my benchmark scores. Your turn.</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/pipelock-gauntlet-public-benchmark/</link><pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/pipelock-gauntlet-public-benchmark/</guid><description>Every score published. Pipelock runs the gauntlet before every release and posts the results for anyone to inspect.</description></item><item><title>LinkedIn Scanned 6,222 Browser Extensions. Your AI Agent's Browser Is Next.</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/linkedin-browsergate-agent-fingerprinting/</link><pubDate>Sat, 04 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/linkedin-browsergate-agent-fingerprinting/</guid><description>LinkedIn&amp;rsquo;s BrowserGate scandal exposed mass extension fingerprinting via first-party JavaScript. The same technique works against headless Chromium browsers running AI agents, and DNS blocking can&amp;rsquo;t stop it.</description></item><item><title>When Your AI Agent Makes an HTTP Request</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/what-happens-when-your-agent-makes-http-request/</link><pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/what-happens-when-your-agent-makes-http-request/</guid><description>You gave your AI agent your secrets and network access. Three things can go wrong, and none of them look like traditional security problems.</description></item><item><title>Cross-Request Exfiltration: 5 Requests Leak a Key</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/cross-request-exfiltration/</link><pubDate>Wed, 11 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/cross-request-exfiltration/</guid><description>Per-request DLP scans each request in isolation. An agent that splits a secret across five requests gets five clean scans and a successful exfiltration. Cross-request detection fixes that.</description></item><item><title>We built a test corpus for AI agent egress security tools</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/agent-egress-bench-benchmark-corpus/</link><pubDate>Sun, 08 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/agent-egress-bench-benchmark-corpus/</guid><description>72 attack cases across 8 categories. Secret exfiltration, prompt injection, MCP tool poisoning, chain detection. Any security tool can run against it. No vendor lock-in.</description></item><item><title>Your agent leaks secrets in POST bodies, not just URLs</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/secrets-in-post-bodies/</link><pubDate>Fri, 06 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/secrets-in-post-bodies/</guid><description>URL scanning catches secrets in hostnames and query strings. But agents also make POST requests. Secrets in JSON bodies, form fields, multipart uploads, and HTTP headers bypass URL-level DLP entirely.</description></item><item><title>Your MCP server's tool descriptions are an attack surface</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/tool-poisoning-mcp-attack-surface/</link><pubDate>Thu, 05 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/tool-poisoning-mcp-attack-surface/</guid><description>MCP tool descriptions go straight into your agent&amp;rsquo;s context window. A malicious server hides instructions in them. Your agent reads them and obeys. Here&amp;rsquo;s the attack, three variants, and what catches it at the network layer.</description></item><item><title>OBLITERATUS Stripped Your Model's Safety. The Network Layer Is What's Left.</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/guardrails-deleted-now-what/</link><pubDate>Thu, 05 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/guardrails-deleted-now-what/</guid><description>OBLITERATUS and similar tools remove safety guardrails from open-weight models using weight ablation. When the model won&amp;rsquo;t refuse, your only defense is the network layer.</description></item><item><title>CVE-2026-25253: WebSocket Hijacking in OpenClaw AI Agents</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/openclaw-cve-2026-25253/</link><pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/openclaw-cve-2026-25253/</guid><description>A CVSS 8.8 vulnerability in OpenClaw lets attackers hijack agent sessions via cross-site WebSocket. The attack chain, what each step does, and how to add defense-in-depth.</description></item><item><title>Your AI agent leaks API keys through DNS queries</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/dns-exfil-ai-agent/</link><pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/dns-exfil-ai-agent/</guid><description>Most DLP tools scan HTTP bodies. Your secrets leak before that, in the DNS lookup. Here&amp;rsquo;s the attack, the proof, and why scan ordering matters.</description></item><item><title>Every protocol your agent speaks, scanned</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/every-protocol-your-agent-speaks-scanned/</link><pubDate>Tue, 24 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/every-protocol-your-agent-speaks-scanned/</guid><description>AI agents talk over HTTP, MCP, and WebSocket. Each protocol has its own attack surface. Here&amp;rsquo;s what can go wrong on each one.</description></item><item><title>Your Agent Just Leaked Your AWS Keys: The Attack and Fix</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/your-agent-just-leaked-your-aws-keys/</link><pubDate>Sun, 22 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/your-agent-just-leaked-your-aws-keys/</guid><description>A prompt injection tells your coding agent to exfiltrate credentials via HTTP. No malware. Here&amp;rsquo;s the attack, the output, and the config that stops it.</description></item><item><title>What Is an Agent Firewall? A Plain-Language Explainer</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/what-is-an-agent-firewall/</link><pubDate>Sat, 21 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/what-is-an-agent-firewall/</guid><description>An agent firewall sits between an AI agent and everything it talks to, scanning traffic in both directions. Here&amp;rsquo;s what it is, what it catches, and how it differs from older network security tools.</description></item><item><title>EU AI Act Runtime Security: What You Need Before August</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/eu-ai-act-runtime-security/</link><pubDate>Sat, 14 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/eu-ai-act-runtime-security/</guid><description>The EU AI Act&amp;rsquo;s high-risk requirements take effect August 2, 2026. The compliance standard won&amp;rsquo;t land until Q4. Here&amp;rsquo;s what to build now if you&amp;rsquo;re running AI agents.</description></item><item><title>First AI Agent Espionage Campaign</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/first-ai-agent-espionage-campaign/</link><pubDate>Fri, 13 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/first-ai-agent-espionage-campaign/</guid><description>Anthropic disclosed GTG-1002, the first AI agent espionage campaign. A state actor jailbroke Claude Code for autonomous hacking. What happened and which defenses work.</description></item><item><title>What's next for Pipelock: the v0.2 roadmap</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/pipelock-v02-roadmap/</link><pubDate>Wed, 11 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/pipelock-v02-roadmap/</guid><description>GitHub Actions, MCP input scanning, smart DLP, and what Pipelock Pro will look like.</description></item><item><title>Wrapping Claude Code MCP Servers with Pipelock</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/securing-claude-code-with-pipelock/</link><pubDate>Tue, 10 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/securing-claude-code-with-pipelock/</guid><description>Claude Code has shell access, API keys, and MCP servers feeding directly into its context window. Here&amp;rsquo;s what can go wrong and how to lock it down.</description></item><item><title>283 ClawHub Skills Are Leaking Your Secrets</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/leaky-clawhub-skills/</link><pubDate>Mon, 09 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/leaky-clawhub-skills/</guid><description>Snyk found 283 ClawHub skills leaking API keys through the LLM context window. Static scanning can&amp;rsquo;t catch runtime exfiltration. Here&amp;rsquo;s what can.</description></item><item><title>One Injection, Whole Mesh: Lateral Movement in Multi-Agent LLMs</title><link>https://pipelab.org/blog/lateral-movement-multi-agent-llm/</link><pubDate>Sun, 08 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pipelab.org/blog/lateral-movement-multi-agent-llm/</guid><description>When one compromised agent can pivot to others through shared context, MCP servers, or tool delegation, a single injection compromises the entire mesh.</description></item></channel></rss>