Pipelock vs Lakera Guard is a comparison across trust boundaries. Pipelock emits mediator-signed action receipts from outside the agent trust boundary, scanning HTTP, MCP, and WebSocket egress. Lakera Guard is an inference-boundary classifier API that Check Point acquired in September 2025 and now ships as part of their AI security platform. One protects the actions the agent takes. The other protects the conversation with the LLM.
The short version
Pipelock is an open-source agent firewall. It scans HTTP, MCP, and WebSocket traffic for credential leaks, prompt injection, SSRF, and tool poisoning. Single Go binary, self-hosted, Apache 2.0 core. Every decision can emit a mediator-signed action receipt from a signing key Pipelock holds outside the agent trust boundary.
Lakera Guard is a runtime classifier API for LLM applications, now part of the Check Point security platform after the September 2025 acquisition. The integration shape is a POST to /v2/guard on each LLM interaction: the application sends the raw user input (and optionally the model’s response) and Lakera returns classification verdicts for prompt injection, data leakage, jailbreaks, toxic content, and multilingual or multimodal attacks. The default deployment is SaaS; enterprise customers like Dropbox run the same logic as a Docker container inside their own infrastructure.
Pipelock inspects what the agent sends and receives over the network. Lakera Guard classifies what the application sends to and receives from the model.
Feature comparison
| Feature | Pipelock | Lakera Guard |
|---|---|---|
| Architecture | Network proxy (single binary, self-hosted) | Classifier API (SaaS, with enterprise Docker option) |
| Primary enforcement point | Agent egress: HTTP, HTTPS, CONNECT, WebSocket, MCP stdio, MCP HTTP/SSE | Inference boundary: prompts into the LLM, completions out of it |
| HTTP egress scanning | Yes | No |
| WebSocket frame scanning | Yes | No |
| MCP awareness (tools, args, responses) | Yes, bidirectional | Not documented in public docs |
| DLP / credential pattern matching | 48 built-in patterns with 6-pass encoding normalization | Data-leakage classifier on prompt and completion content |
| Prompt injection detection | 25 deterministic patterns plus 6-pass normalization | ML classifier, continuously updated against Gandalf crowd-sourced attacks |
| Tool poisoning and rug-pull detection | Yes | Not applicable (no MCP surface) |
| SSRF and private-IP blocking | Yes, before DNS resolution | Not applicable |
| Detection approach | Deterministic regex plus normalization passes | Model-based classifier |
| Per-decision signed evidence | Mediator-signed action receipts plus flight recorder | Verdict JSON in API response; application logs it |
| Compliance mappings | OWASP MCP Top 10, OWASP Agentic Top 15, NIST 800-53, EU AI Act, SOC 2 | OWASP LLM Top 10 (cited in OWASP 2025 landscape guide) |
| Process sandbox | Yes (Landlock, seccomp, netns on Linux) | No |
| Source availability | Open source (Apache 2.0 core) | Closed source, commercial |
| Self-hosted | Yes (standard deployment) | Enterprise Docker only; default is SaaS |
| Model-agnostic | Yes (any agent, any LLM) | Yes (any model) |
| Pricing | Free (Apache 2.0); Pro starts at $49/mo | Contact sales (Check Point enterprise pricing) |
When to pick Pipelock
Your threat model extends past the LLM call. Agents that call MCP servers, fetch web pages, open WebSockets, or make arbitrary HTTP requests take actions that a classifier on prompt and completion I/O cannot see. A tool call to rm -rf / does not traverse the LLM API at execution time. A leaked AWS key in a POST body does not either. Pipelock scans the traffic the agent actually emits.
You need MCP-specific awareness. Pipelock parses MCP framing, detects poisoned tool descriptions, flags rug-pull drift when a previously trusted tool changes its schema mid-session, and scans tool call arguments and responses bidirectionally. Lakera Guard does not operate on the MCP surface.
You want deterministic enforcement and offline-verifiable evidence. Pipelock’s detection patterns are open source; every match is reproducible from the same input. Every blocked decision can emit a mediator-signed action receipt that an external verifier (including the published Python verifier in pipelock-verify-python) can validate without running Pipelock. Classifier decisions are harder to reproduce and harder to audit after the fact.
You want to run the entire security stack yourself. Pipelock is a single Go binary under Apache 2.0. No SaaS account, no API keys to the vendor, no telemetry to a third party. The Docker option Lakera offers is enterprise-gated; the default posture is SaaS.
When to pick Lakera Guard
Your application shape is a chatbot, a RAG pipeline, or a copilot that talks to an LLM API. The control point that matters is what enters the model and what leaves it. Lakera Guard is purpose-built for that boundary, and one API call in front of each LLM interaction is a clean integration shape.
You value continuously-updated classifier coverage over deterministic patterns. Lakera’s detection is updated from Gandalf, their crowd-sourced jailbreak game. When novel injection wording appears in the wild, the classifier absorbs it without requiring a rule rewrite on your side.
You already run Check Point for network security. After the September 2025 acquisition, Lakera Guard is positioned as part of a broader Check Point platform. If your security team is a Check Point shop, the vendor consolidation story is a real buyer consideration.
You need sub-50 ms latency on prompt classification. Lakera publishes sub-50 ms latency for classifier calls. Any content-inspection proxy, including Pipelock, adds more latency because the inspection work is deeper.
Architecture differences
Pipelock and Lakera Guard answer different questions.
Lakera Guard asks: is this prompt or completion safe to pass through the LLM boundary? The answer comes from a classifier trained on real-world attacks. The integration point is the application code that talks to the model: the application makes a POST to /v2/guard before and after each LLM call, and the verdict gates the conversation. Anything that does not traverse the LLM API (direct tool calls, MCP traffic, arbitrary HTTP egress) is outside the control surface.
Pipelock asks: what is actually moving across the agent’s network boundary, and is any of it unsafe? The answer is content inspection on HTTP, WebSocket, and MCP. Every outbound request body gets checked for leaked credentials. Every MCP tool description gets checked for poisoning and drift. Every response coming back gets checked for prompt injection patterns across six normalization passes. SSRF checks run before DNS resolution so DNS queries cannot be used to exfiltrate secrets.
These are different enforcement points. A deployment that cares about both the model conversation and the agent’s actions downstream of the model can run both. Lakera Guard guards the LLM boundary. Pipelock guards everything after.
A note on evidence
Both tools produce records of their decisions, but the shape and the trust model differ.
Lakera Guard returns a verdict in the API response. The calling application can log it. The application holds the record, and the application can also choose not to log it.
Pipelock emits a mediator-signed action receipt from a signing key Pipelock holds outside the agent process. The receipt contains the action, the policy hash, the decision, and a chain-link hash to the previous receipt in the session. An external verifier can validate any receipt against Pipelock’s published public key without involving Pipelock, the agent, or the application code. The format is open and pairs with a separate reference Python verifier (pipelock-verify-python) for cross-language byte-for-byte validation.
This is not a claim that one is better than the other. It is a claim about where the evidentiary anchor sits. For compliance and incident-response workflows that need attestable records from outside the process that generated them, the signer location matters.
Third-party feature descriptions are based on public materials reviewed in April 2026. Features and capabilities may change. Check each project’s current documentation for the latest.
Further reading
- Pipelock : the full product page
- What is an agent firewall? : category definition and evaluation checklist
- Agent egress security : why egress is the control point for agents
- Open source AI firewall : the category Pipelock sits in
- Action receipt spec : the wire format for Pipelock’s mediator-signed action receipts
- Lakera : the product site (now part of Check Point)
- Pipelock on GitHub