Sandboxes and scanners

Pipelock vs ToolHive

Stacklok's runtime puts every MCP server in an isolated container with permissions and secrets management. Pipelock inspects routed server traffic and can emit signed receipts when configured.

At a glance

Pipelock source ToolHive
Job Agent firewall. Mediates HTTP, WebSocket, and MCP traffic routed through it, scans it for secret leaks, prompt injection, SSRF, and tool poisoning, and can emit signed action receipts for mediated decisions when a signing key is configured. Runs every MCP server in an isolated container with a minimal permission file, encrypted secrets, network access filtering, a registry, and a Kubernetes operator; enforces identity and access policy per request when an auth source is configured.
Enforcement point Network path, outside the agent process The container around each MCP server and the proxy in front of it
Source Open source, Apache-2.0 core; Enterprise under ELv2 Open source, Apache-2.0 (Stacklok)
Pricing shape Free core; paid Pro and Enterprise tiers Free
Runs as Single Go binary, self-hosted; container and Helm CLI and desktop app locally; Kubernetes operator with CRDs
Pick ToolHive

You run a fleet of MCP servers and want each one containerized with no local credentials, scoped permissions, managed secrets, and a registry, on a laptop or in Kubernetes.

Pick Pipelock

You need the tool descriptions, arguments, and responses inspected for poisoning, leaks, and injection, HTTP and WebSocket covered too, and signed receipts when configured.

Run both

ToolHive contains and manages the servers. Pipelock inspects the traffic between the agent and those servers. Wrap ToolHive's endpoints with Pipelock and keep both.

Want the runtime boundary, not just another checklist?

The short version

Pipelock is an open-source agent firewall. It inspects HTTP, WebSocket, and MCP traffic routed through it for credential leaks, prompt injection, SSRF, and tool poisoning, and can emit signed action receipts for mediated decisions when a signing key is configured.

ToolHive is Stacklok’s Apache-2.0 runtime for MCP servers. Its README describes running every server in an isolated container with a minimal permission file and no local credentials. Around that it adds encrypted secrets, network isolation and access filtering, a registry of servers, provenance verification and signing, a virtual MCP workflow engine, and a Kubernetes operator with custom resources. With an authentication source configured it enforces identity and access policy per request.

ToolHive answers how a server runs, what it may reach, and who may call it. Pipelock answers what the server says and proves the decision.

Feature comparison

FeaturePipelockToolHive
ArchitectureNetwork proxy, single self-hosted Go binaryContainer runtime and proxy for MCP servers; CLI, desktop app, Kubernetes operator
What it coversHTTP, HTTPS CONNECT (payloads only with TLS interception on), WebSocket, MCP stdio and HTTP, A2AMCP servers it runs or proxies
Container isolationNo; process-level sandbox insteadYes, per server, minimal permission file
SecretsHolds none by designEncrypted secrets management; no local credentials in the server container
Network controlDomain policy plus content scanningNetwork isolation and access filtering per server
Identity and accessTool policy via configPer-request identity and access policy with an auth source
Registry and provenanceNoRegistry, provenance verification, server signing
Credential scanning (DLP)65 patterns, encoding-aware, on the trafficNot documented
Prompt injection detectionDeterministic patterns with multi-pass normalizationNot documented
Tool poisoning and rug-pull driftFingerprinting and drift detectionNot documented
Signed receiptsYes, Ed25519, verifiable offlineNot documented
Process sandbox for the agentLandlock, seccomp, and network namespacesNot in scope; ToolHive contains servers, not the agent
LicenseApache-2.0 core; Enterprise under ELv2Apache-2.0

Where ToolHive is stronger

Server containment. Each MCP server runs in its own container with scoped permissions and no local credentials. A misbehaving server is boxed in.

Secrets and network filtering. Encrypted secrets handed to servers as needed, and network access filtering per server.

Fleet management. A registry, a Kubernetes operator with custom resources, remote server proxying, and provenance checks on what gets run.

Identity-aware access. With an auth source, policy is enforced per request by identity.

Where Pipelock is stronger

Payload inspection. A contained server can still return an injected response or change its tool description. Pipelock fingerprints descriptions, flags drift, decodes and scans arguments for secrets, and scans responses for injection.

Beyond MCP. Pipelock also inspects the agent’s HTTP and WebSocket egress.

Evidence. With a signing key configured, Pipelock can emit signed receipts for mediated decisions that an auditor verifies offline.

Containing the agent, not only the servers. Pipelock’s sandbox wraps the agent process itself with Landlock, seccomp, and a network namespace.

The container-versus-content distinction

Isolation answers whether a server can escape or reach something it shouldn’t. Inspection answers whether a server’s traffic is leaking credentials or injecting instructions. A server that reads a host file it shouldn’t is stopped by ToolHive. A server whose tool description quietly changes to add exfiltration instructions is valid MCP traffic to a container boundary, and Pipelock is the layer that sees it.

Further reading

Sources checked

Third-party descriptions on this page come from the public materials below, read on the dates shown. Features and pricing change; check the current documentation before you decide.

  • stacklok/toolhive README checked 2026-09-01 · Apache-2.0; isolated containers, minimal permission file, encrypted secrets, network isolation, registry, Kubernetes operator, provenance verification
  • ToolHive documentation checked 2026-09-01 · runtime with fine-grained permissions, network access filtering, and secrets management; remote server proxying
  • ToolHive releases checked 2026-09-01 · v0.46.0 from August 2026 was the newest release at the time of checking

Third-party product names and marks belong to their owners. PipeLab is not affiliated with, sponsored by, or endorsed by the makers of any product compared on this page. Descriptions of other products come from their own public materials on the dates listed above and reflect PipeLab's reading of them. If something here is wrong or out of date, tell us and it will be corrected.

Frequently asked questions

What's the difference between Pipelock and ToolHive?
ToolHive is Stacklok’s runtime for MCP servers. It runs each server in an isolated container with a minimal permission file and no local credentials, manages encrypted secrets, filters network access, and adds a registry and a Kubernetes operator. Pipelock is an agent firewall that inspects routed HTTP, WebSocket, and MCP traffic and can emit signed receipts when a signing key is configured. ToolHive controls the server’s environment. Pipelock reads what the server sends when its traffic is routed through Pipelock.
Does ToolHive scan tool descriptions or responses?
Its README and docs describe isolation, permissions, secrets, network access filtering, per-request identity and access policy with an auth source, provenance verification, and server signing. Content scanning of tool descriptions, arguments, or responses, drift detection, and signed receipts are not documented.
Can I use both?
Yes. ToolHive runs and contains the servers; Pipelock wraps the transport between the agent and those servers for inspection and receipts. Container isolation and payload inspection stop different failures.

Want the runtime boundary, not just another checklist?

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